Abstract. Criticisms of postmodernism are examined in the context
. It has also been accused of being a 'fatal distraction' for organization research (Thompson, 1993) . Postmodern ideas have been subject to heavy criticism by many organization theorists (e.g. Reed, 1992 Reed, , 1993 Thompson, 1993; Feldman, 1997) on the grounds that they eclectically combine fragments of sociological analysis, literary and cultural readings, historical theorization and philosophical critiques. Hall and Neitz (1993: 244) claim that 'there is little to expect a "post" situation to have any original status, or any definable characteristics, but a jumble'. As such, postmodern organization theorists face the charges of not being serious, and even worse, of having elevated 'individualism, although only implicitly, to the role of . . . supreme value' (Feldman, 1997: 944) . Feldman specifically charges that:
. . . the warnings of Foucault-inspired organization theorists against systemic rationalities carry on a tradition of rebellion against communal authority. It is this rebellion and this desire for an impossible autonomy that continue to make the power/knowledge framework attractive today and lead many distrustful minds along the absurd road to endless criticism. (Feldman, 1997: 948) We think these views overlook key elements of postmodern contributions to organization studies. For instance there are several fruitful seams of Foucault's thematics. In this article these thematics are examined first by cataloguing criticisms levelled against postmodern perspectives in the two fields: social theory and organization theory. We then counterbalance these criticisms by drawing on Foucault's ethics. We argue that this perspective contributes substantively to a moral theory that is much needed in postmodern organization studies (e.g. McKinlay and Starkey, 1998; Hancock and Tyler, 2001) , and in critical management studies (e.g. Fournier and Grey, 2000; Westwood and Linstead, 2001; Casey, 2002) . Our analysis commences with the criticisms of postmodernism in the context of 'social theory'. We then move on to examine what postmodernism 'does' in the sub-field of organization theory.
Postmodernism and Social Theory
The tradition of modern social theory, according to Best and Kellner (1991: 258) is to 'analyse the fundamental structures and processes of modern societies'. Since the seminal projects of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, social theory's main concerns have been differentiating types of social structures and the investigation of causes and consequences of social change. Social theory provides explanations for macro-processes such as commodification, massification, reification, and domination, and the causes and consequences of social change such as social rationalization, individuation and differentiation. Indeed, the 'historical task of modern social theory has been to analyse the ways that the economy, state, society, and culture interact to form social organization that is Organization 9(4) Articles distinct from those in traditional societies' (Best and Kellner, 1991: 258) .
Social theory has been built on a set of social practices with a fixed system of representation, a (reasonable) consensus about research and a 'warrant' about social phenomena to be studied. These are foundational (modernist) assumptions and practices that continue to guide social theory research. Postmodernism's long march from the distant shores of the arts and culture (especially aesthetic postmodernity) has begun to question the tenability of the core tenets of the social sciences and social theory. The reception of postmodernism in social theory has been riddled with contests and protests (as has been the case in organization theory).
The definition of 'postmodernism' has always been a delicate matter. There is still no consensus about the different kinds of postmodernisms. In the literature, there are two main strands of postmodernisms: 'postmodernism' as representing an historical periodization (an epoch), and 'postmodernism' as a theoretical perspective or a critique (an epistemology). These strands contribute to questions (and confusion) about the clarity or defining characteristics of postmodernism. Hassan (1985: 122) refers to the issue of epoch in this way: 'a period is generally not a period at all; it is rather both a diachronic and synchronic construct'. Generally, this perspective holds that a period or epoch 'permeates' the past, the present, and the future; hence events within both 'periods' of modernism and postmodernism inherently implode into one another. Time, history and 'period' are not perceived in terms of linear, successive patterns. They mingle sequentially and concurrently into an 'intertextual' history that can be experienced in what Derrida refers to as a 'palimpsest', and in what Freud suggests-the Magic Writing Pad-where every text (event) ever 'written' is related to every other text (event) that may come before or after it. This is because each text (event) that is 'written' has registered its 'traces' (pathways or tracks) in the waxed base of the pad even after the double wax surface (paper and celluloid) has been lifted. All other subsequent text (event) can be said to implode into the impress-ion of the traces of the texts (events) previously there. Hassan holds that postmodernism is no exception; to define and delineate itself as a period (an epoch), postmodernism requires both historical specificity and theoretical precision.
Hassan's remark helps to explain the paradox which Honneth (1985: 147) notes in relation to the 'period issue', that the 'suggestiveness' of the idea of the postmodern has increased, but at the same time, its 'technical and temporal clarity' has decreased. Queries have been raised as to how, and in what specific ways post-modernism can claim it is historically 'past' modernism. There have been a number of reiterations that postmodernism, as epistemology (and as critique), is already anticipated in reflexive or critical modernism (Harvey, 1989: 39-65; Crook, 1990: 53-58) . This means that postmodernism has antecedents in certain late-
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Andrew Chan and John Garrick 19th to early-20th-century modernist and avant-garde philosophies and cultural movements that focused on relativism, perspectivism, subjectivity, and language. There are relational intricacies arising from the etymological proximity of postmodernism to modernism that we think reduce the 'novelty value' of postmodernism.
The key notions surrounding postmodernism are, however, vexatious. They have created considerable reservations and criticisms about the abilities of postmodernism to deliver its promises to 'do social theory proper' (see Boyne and Rattansi, 1990; Best and Kellner, 1991; Seidman, 1992; Layder, 1994; Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000) . The criticism levelled against postmodernism's infiltration into the heartland of social theory can be unpacked to reveal three facets: epistemological 'nihilism', a textual labyrinth, and disenchantment with the Enlightenment project. We examine each of these criticisms in turn.
Epistemological 'Nihilism' Ackroyd and Fleetwood (2000) point out that some 'critical realists' express their view that postmodernists practise an epistemological nihilism that disavows conventional criteria for representing reality and for evaluating knowledge (see Reed, 1992; Layder, 1994; Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000) . For instance, within social theory, postmodernism is described as wholesale 'epistemic suspicion' (Seidman, 1992: 68) , a 'politics of subversion' (Seidman, 1998 , referring to Derridean deconstruction), an 'adolescent iconoclasm' (Sayer, 2000: 49 , agreeing with Habermas's characterization of 'crypto-normativity' in Foucault), a variegation of relativism (Archer, 1995: 344) , 'sweeping and ill-founded' (Layder, 1994: 51) , and an assault on the modern, realist concept of representation. Modernist representation assumes the possibility of a true image being reproduced or re-presented.
'Sceptical postmodernists' reject this, claiming the apprehension of reality is mediated. The notion of unmediated access to reality is brought seriously in doubt. And truth, to the extent that it strives to re-present reality, is considered by some postmodernists with incredulity. The most important implication of this kind of 'sceptical postmodernism' is that there are no differences between truth and ideology, or between distorted forms of rhetoric and propaganda. This is precisely where critics of postmodernism charge that such views will inevitably erode the consensual relations and systematic features of 'practical social theorizing [whose] aim is to explain why things structural, cultural and agential are so and not otherwise' (Archer, 1995: 344) . Realists like Archer, Layder, Reed and Sayer also believe it will cause instability in the nature, validity and limits of inquiry-the basic tenets of social theory research.
A Textual Labyrinth
Aspects of postmodernism assail language, communication, and truth claims. Language is viewed as a form of domination, and representational Organization 9(4) Articles strategies that use language as their medium are 'surrogates of terrorism' (Rosenau, 1992: 78) . Critics claim, however, that this postmodern perspective is obsession with detail, and is regressive-venturing endlessly into a labyrinth of textual and discursive worlds (Reed, 1998) . By examining the uniqueness of the parts rather than the unity of the theoretical whole, critics claim this approach creates a closed form of thinking and a new kind of supra-disciplinary discourse producing only 'local narratives' or parochial claims that are relevant only to its own constituencies.
This so-called 'textual turn' or rhetorical critique treats the social world as a text to be 'read' rather than an objective reality to be apprehended. It shows how texts 'create a sense of reality, even in the absence of the capacity of any text to represent or correspond to reality' (Rosenau, 1992) . This perspective shows the fictive and fictional character of narratives about the social world. Organizational narratives about 'human resource development', 'organizational learning', 'total quality assurance' and so on are some examples. The 'reality' of such narratives is constituted through shared language (Westwood and Linstead, 2001 ). This textual perspective draws on the theories of Jacques Derrida who argues that knowledge is metaphoric, offering only signifiers or images by which we understand the world. For Derrida, the history of a metaphor appears:
. . . not as a displacement with breaks, as re-inscription in a heterogeneous system, mutations, separations without origin, but rather as a progressive erosion, a regular sematic loss, an uninterrupted exhausting of the primitive meaning: an empirical abstraction without extraction from its own native soil. (Derrida, 1982: 215) This textual predilection is devastating for objectivist and structuralist theories of social organization that rely on analytic concepts to grapple with 'real' social processes that are otherwise invisible to everyday appearance. As such, postmodern thinking is criticized for paralysing 'constructive' theorizing and distracting effort to attain knowledge by dissipating energy amidst the minutiae of issues of knowing (see Reed, 1992) . Conservative social theorists warn that postmodern incredulity and 'defeatist postmodernism' (Sayer, 2000: 67-80) will result in sterility in thought, in immobility in action, and in unprecedented change within social theory (see Best and Kellner, 1991; Seidman, 1992 Seidman, , 1998 .
Disenchantment with the Enlightenment Project
The third and arguably most damning claim is that postmodernist theorists like Baudrillard and Lyotard are not doing social theory per se; rather, they are eclectically combining 'fragments of sociological analysis, literary and cultural readings, historical theorization, and philosophical critiques in their exegeses' (Best and Kellner, 1991: 259) . The iconoclastic claims of the postmodernists and their collective proclivity are perceived
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Andrew Chan and John Garrick to be 'prejudice' against modernism, modernity, the Enlightenment project, and a misreading of rationality. A widely accepted image of the modernist project is that it amounts to an intellectual effort (on the part of Enlightenment thinkers and their successors) to develop objective science, universal morality and law. The idea is to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. Rosenau (1992) points out that the unfolding of world events throughout the 20th century, especially militarism, the two world wars and the advent of nuclear weapons, has shattered this optimism. Recent world events (e.g. proliferating biological and chemical weapons; the immediate scientific prospect of 'cloning humans'; September 11, 2001 and its aftermath; conflicts in Afghanistan; environmental degradation) have done little to dispel this disenchantment. Twentieth-century variants of the Enlightenment project are, with substantial justification, being read as 'failed promises', further fuelling the radical interrogation of the modernist project. As recently as ten years ago, critics such as Best and Kellner (1991) and Thompson (1993) argued that social theory has not yet harnessed the self-reflexive capacities integral to the modernist project. Instead it has courted postmodernism. This 'fatal attraction' is said to result in a complex process of colonization by 'abrasive' characteristics of aesthetic postmodernity, which rejects universal standards of beauty, and favours pastiche, heteroglossia, carnivalesque, the marginal, the fleeting and the unrepeatable. Postmodernism in social theory champions evocation and re-presentation, language games and agonistics, relativism and diversity. A major criticism is that such eclectic treatment privileges idealism and cultural analyses based on local knowledge over 'proper' social theory and empirical engagement with real life.
This 'skew' in the discipline's overriding emphasis is seen as failing to address sufficiently the decisive determinants of the social world. For organizational realists like Thompson (1993) , the question is: 'what has a rejection of universal standards of beauty and a preference for pastiche' got to do with organizations? This is precisely where Foucault's later works make a valuable (and somewhat neglected) contribution. More specifically, the critical ideas of Foucault about ethics are important because they signify a rethinking in the way we do theory in organization studies. And it is to this 'doing' that our attention now turns.
The 'Doing' of Postmodern Organization Theory
The key criticisms we have highlighted so far centre on three issues. First, postmodern theorists have a preoccupation with linguistic indeterminacy and linguistic relativism. Second, they are preoccupied with the 'minutiae' of everyday life and third, they are disinterested in the objectives of the Enlightenment and are thus incapable of specifying action in terms of 'wider' issues like structures, systems and organizaOrganization 9(4) Articles tional design. We now briefly re-examine each of these criticisms as they apply to 'organization theory'.
Language Games
Postmodern theory holds that language transforms everything, and most significantly, truth, into a largely linguistic convention. Any fixed system of meanings with/(in) which words, images, and symbols correspond has to give way to an arbitrary, artificial 'non-system' of signs that produces and reproduces its own world without reference to reality. This means language (or signifiers) is taken as symbols that are assumed to have no direct referential relationship to the referents, the signified, or objects in the real world. In this way, Truth becomes 'truth claims', or an effect of discourse. Critics point out that the paralysis inflicted by such postmodern assumptions is that it is impossible to say anything definite; hence language (and any other means of communication) cannot assure truth. Since theory implies knowledge and truth, and truth, at least in conventional organization theory, is theoretical in character, the implication is that postmodern theorizing is incapable of constructing and producing new knowledge-in the modern sense!
The Minutiae of Everyday Life
Postmodern organization theorists (especially deconstructionists) are criticized for their preoccupation with the 'minutiae' of everyday life (Reed, 1998) , specifically with the exploration of language, meaning, overt and covert intentions in/of what somebody says and/or writes. Such a concentration is construed as delving obsessively into a labyrinth of textual entanglement. Such entanglement results in a propagation and deployment of 'textualist methods that multiply paradox, inventing ever more elaborate repertoire of questions, each of which encourages an infinity of answers, rather than methods that settle on solutions' (Rosenau, 1992: 117) . For Thompson (1993) the consequence of overly subscribing to this kind of deconstruction, or postmodern critique, is a distraction for mainstream organization research. This is because the 'thematic continuities' in mainstream research programmes are unnecessarily confused by what Pfeffer (1993) calls trivial issues of methods and rhetoric, and the infinitely vexing questions of epistemology (Reed, 1985 (Reed, , 1998 . In turn these are meant to paralyse action.
Inability to Specify Action and Change
Postmodern theorists are criticized for their disinterest in the so-called 'real world'. Couched within academe they are said to be incapable of specifying mechanisms of action and change-in terms of the practical realities like dysfunctional workplaces, oppressive institutional structures, systems and designs, and 'hard-nosed' economics and politics. Postmodern theory has 'problems theorizing macro-structures and seeing
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Andrew Chan and John Garrick how totalizing tendencies, like capitalism and gender and racial oppression, permeate microstructures and the plurality and differences celebrated in the theory' (Best and Kellner, 1991: 288) . In part we concur with such mainstream concerns. The challenge remains for postmodernists to be clear about frameworks of actions and change being suggested in relation to issues of institutionalized power structures within 'flexible' and 'hegemonic' capitalism (Sennett, 1998; Casey, 2002) :
The complex problems of moral action and irrationality within instrumental organization, which both managerial and critical organizational analysis have tended to under-recognize, arise again. While a defensive moral proclamation of righteous paradigm difference is uncommon, a more rigorous, reflexive, social ethic of analysis of organization is rare. The advent of postmodernism in organization analysis has both exacerbated this situation and opened up unexpected possibilities for critical organizational analysis, and practice. (Casey, 2002: 113) Indeed, dissent and major internal fragmenting dynamics within organization studies have been noted by Reed as 'deep-seated and inherent in the discipline's accumulated intellectual heritage ' (1993: 163) . To be fair, Reed (1992) has rightly pointed out that a field of knowledge or any discipline can only be considered as 'sufficiently developed' and robust if it is 'supported by sufficient rudimentary intellectual structures'. By this standard, critics could argue that postmodern organization theory is just developing and we can identify at least three justifications for this assertion, as follows.
(a) Postmodern organization theory is self-contradictory. Some critics hold that the claims of postmodern theorists are often self-contradictory. This is reflected in their writings that aim at unleashing a widespread, general 'epistemic suspicion' (Seidman, 1992) over modernist discourses. They are criticized for turning the modern knowing subject or producer of organizational knowledge into a 'suspect', who is viewed as insinuated into his or her 'products (knowledge)'. Postmodern theorists argue that one should not believe that the claims by modernist 'knowing' subjects have created any universally valid categories of explanations. For postmodernists, the claims of their modernist counterparts are the reflections of a particular standpoint subscribed by a particular knowledge producer. An 'objectivity truth' has no place in postmodern organizational discourse in that it is seen as an enacted aspect of the subject-object dualism espoused by positivists. As such the notion of objectivity is contentious, self-contradicting, suspicious and undesirable. It is precisely on this point that postmodern theorists are attacked. This is because objectivity is powerfully seductive. At the same time, while warning of others' inconsistencies, postmodernists tend to reject being bound by consistent (reified) norms themselves. Critics thus argue that this position makes working in organizations difficult at best. Postmodern reflexivity is Organization 9(4) Articles therefore dismissed as epistemological posturing, confessional selfreflexive examination that merely promulgates relativism, solipsism, nihilism, or in Feldman's terms, an 'impossible autonomy' and an 'absurd road of endless criticism' (Feldman, 1997: 948) . Postmodern organization theorists' research is described as a 'pathetic babble of squabbling factions which speak different languages and are unable to communicate with each other, [let alone] share any sense of intellectual continuity and community' (Reed, 1992: 38) . Such strong condemnation is intended to leave little space for debate! And of course we see this as counterproductive.
(b) Postmodern organization theory is vacuous. The postmodernist infiltration in organization theory is further criticized as not being conducive to forming a 'field of phenomena which yields problems of investigation' (Reed, 1992) . There are several reasons for this false start made by the postmodernists. Thompson (1993: 194) points out that postmodernist approaches rely too much on perspectivism, whereby the 'constructs of individuals and groups take precedent over facts or objective truths'. Realist social theorists discount the value of the attention paid to the fleeting, the local, and the unrepeatable (Archer, 1995: 343-4; Sayer, 2000: 68, 72-8) . Though we acknowledge that not all realists reject postmodernism (see, for example, Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000: 6-8), to some of them the throughputs and outcomes of these marginal analyses are skewed towards 'local narratives, locked in self-limited space and time, focusing on the perceptions and experiences of particular groupings' (Thompson, 1993: 197) . Reed (1998) and Thompson (1993) declare that by following postmodern ideas, organizational analysis and research will drift away from its main content-structures, systems and organizational designtowards a concern for process. Further, there is an uneven theoretical preoccupation and moral commitment that has de-emphasized organizational content in favour of issues of knowing and epistemology. For these critics, postmodern perspectives are 'buried in an obsessive concern for the minutiae of the everyday life of organizational routines' (Reed, 1985: 48) . The postmodernists within organization theory are accused of undermining the search for, and study of, the functions and meanings of structures and organizing processes within organizations. For them it follows that the organization theory community has to be sensitized about Thompson's 'fatal distraction'-lest the principal purposes of the sub-discipline are forgotten. We disagree with such a view, as it represents epistemological closure of another sort.
(c) Postmodern organization theory as inaction and non-change.
By the standards of conventional organization theory, no widely accepted or actionable agenda is in sight in postmodern theories. They do not
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Andrew Chan and John Garrick necessarily specify mechanisms for change. The postmodernists' ambiguous and variegated political orientation regarding mechanisms of change is viewed as reactionary; the postmodern attitude is thus often considered as disinterested and incapable of serious change (Feldman, 1997) . Reed suggests that organization theorists' recurring concern should be about how to promulgate relatively well-defined, widely accepted and enduring social practices so that these concerns would evolve into a field of study with internally coherent and commonly accepted rules and research protocols. Postmodernism, on the other hand, is used primarily to denote a way of seeing the (organizational) world. Clearly, postmodernism does not meet Reed's (realist) standards for an evolved 'field' of study. Indeed, postmodernism is often seen as lacking ethics and dangerous to the establishment, its traditions and its constituencies. However, more recent debates have shifted towards the viability of a postmodern ethics (Bauman, 1993; Cummings, 2000; Hancock and Tyler, 2001; Casey, 2002) each drawing substantively from Foucault. In the following section we show, in this light, that the conservative claim of 'dangerous to the establishment' is not particularly well founded. Bauman's (1993) definition of postmodern ethics qualifies Foucault's ethics:
The Postmodern Ethics of Foucault
. . . to be postmodern is to know that we have to live with the reality that there can no longer be any 'principled' morality; . . . there are no hard-andfast principles which one can learn, memorize and deploy in order to escape situations and the bitter after-taste of the decisions taken. (Bauman, 1993: 32) Human reality is, in Bauman's view, 'messy and ambiguous', and we must accept that 'moral decisions are ambivalent'. Bauman perceptively observes that it is in this sort of world that we must live, and knowing that to be the truth is to be postmodern, that is:
Postmodernity is modernity without illusions. The illusions in question boil down to the belief that the 'messiness' of the human world is but a temporary and repairable state, sooner or later to be replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of reason. The truth in question is that the 'messiness' will stay whatever we do or know . . . Postmodernity brings 'reenchantment' of the world after the protracted and earnest, though inconclusive, modern struggle to disenchant it. (1993: 32-3) The precarious and resilient character of this postmodern ethos which Bauman is building upon his Intimation of Post-modernity (1992) paradoxically requires clearer, more specific, and even concrete selfreflectivity:
Acceptance of contingency and respect for ambiguity do not come easy; there is no point in playing down their psychological costs . . . The Organization 9(4) Articles postmodern re-enchantment of the world carries a chance of facing human moral capacity point-blank, as it truly is, undisguised and undeformed . . . Not that the world will as a consequence become necessarily better and more hospitable. But it will stand a chance of coming to terms with the tough and resilient human proclivities it evidently failed to legislate away-and of starting from there. Perhaps starting from there will even make the hope of a more humane world more realistic-and this is the reason for its modesty. (Bauman, 1993: 33-4, emphases in original) Notably, then, postmodern ethics for Bauman is 'to let morality out of the stiff armour of the artificially constructed ethical codes [and to] repersonalize it' (Bauman, 1993: 34) . Re-personalizing morality means returning moral responsibility from the finishing line to the starting point of the ethical process. The starting point then is that we must accept that moral responsibility is rooted in the very way we are human. To 'delegitimize or "bracket away" moral impulses and emotions, and try to reconstruct the edifice of ethics out of arguments cleansed of emotional undertones' are 'morally doubtful substitutes' (Bauman, 1993: 35) .
This perspective is substantively indebted to Foucault, whose key contribution to ethics is his formulation of the notion of critique, an embodiment of a free and truth-speaking individual (Foucault, 2001) . For Foucault, the liberal, creatively self-representing individual engages in the present to interrogate assumptions and to seek those practices that offer the possibility of inventing ourselves in what we are becoming (Owen, 1999; Tully, 1999; Robinson, 2001; Strozier, 2002) . This involves re-forming structures of recognition constitutive of subjectivity and uncovering new ways of acting and being. It is this aspect of engaging with organizational realities of power (and possibilities of change) that Foucault's contributions become valuable to organization theory.
His questioning of ways to respond to one's own present as difference in history are important for organization theorists because they turn our ethics, our values, and 'the practices of our institutions' into 'questions that organizational theorists cannot avoid addressing any further' (Calás and Smircich, 1999: 666; see also Casey, 2002: 4-5, 20, 145) . The following analysis asks what this 'way of questioning' is doing in organizational theorizing.
Critical Ontology as Moral Theory
'What is Enlightenment? ' (1984) provides an important outlook on Foucault's later thinking as he 're-reads' the philosophy of the Enlightenment and modernity so as to salvage a critical 'ethos' or 'attitude'. In that work, Foucault contrasts his understanding of aspects of the Enlightenment and modernity with that of Kant. The key notion that both agree on is that of 'maturity', which consists of 'man's taking over responsibility for using his critical rationality in the unflinching examination of our most cherished and comforting assumptions' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986: 110) .
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Kant conceived of the Enlightenment as 'a task and an obligation' requiring mature intellectuals to contemplate the tripartite relationship among reason, the prevalent historical moment, and contemporary society. Kant's famous motto, Aude sapere, means 'dare to know, have the courage, the audacity to know', and it entails critique applied to issues of theoretical understanding, to questions of an ethical or political order.
Foucault has no disagreement with Kant's belief that the Enlightenment is the attainment of maturity through the use of reason and the exercise of critique. Foucault treats critique as a timeless 'ethos' and an 'attitude' to be taken up by intellectuals at all times (Szakolczai, 1998; Robinson, 2001 ). The imperative of maturity for many intellectuals then becomes more than just facing up to the crisis and collapse of the established order of their time, their values and virtues. Rather, it calls for another set of values and philosophical outlook. Various writers 1 believe that we can glimpse this outlook from Foucault's reinterpretation of Kant's tripartite linking of 'the historical moment, critical reason and society'. This represents part of what Casey (2002: 3) considers to be not just a 'renovation and restoration of the same modern agenda and criticism' but a 'revitalization' in organizational analysis, and that is: . . . the task upon us is, out of painstaking reflexivity, one of recomposition and revitalization of sociological organizational analysis. It is one that requires the recognition of new signs of action-action which is endeavoring to generate a surpassing response to the intensified instrumentality of late modernity which reduces social, cultural and planetary life to market commodification. (Casey, 2002: 3-4) We share Casey's belief that a new version of organizational analysis needs to point out what it means as well as how to reverse institutional power and bring about 'real' change in organization and society. That new vision of seeding the 'energy of reversal' (Foucault calls it de la plèbe) within institutional and social practices, according to Foucault, is a 'critical ontology of our selves' that:
. . . has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault, 1984: 50, emphases added) Foucault's redefinition of the Enlightenment involves a reflection of the present through/by exemplifying investigative and recursive thinking (Foucault, 1988: 95) .
2 Under such a formulation of critical thought, the basis of criticism is:
. . . no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as an historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. (Foucault, 1984: 45-6) Organization 9(4) Articles Foucault explicates a moral theory that depends on an effective praxis of 'working on oneself'-a form of aesthetic heroization and resistance that he examined in 'The Art of Telling the Truth ' (1988) and in Fearless Speech (2001) -in which Foucault proposes that it is not just a cultivation of a beautiful soul but a creative self-representation that engages with a real world of change.
Ethics, Self, Organization and Society
As we have mentioned, a principal ethic of Foucault's is 'working on oneself' or care of the self via stylization, heroization and 'aesthetics of living' (Cummings, 2000: 218-21) . It is unfair to dismiss this as valorizing the individual. This philosophical outlook is epitomized in his discussion of Baudelaire. In 'What is Enlightenment? ' (1984: 39ff.) , Foucault illustrates the leitmotif of exemplarity as critique. 'Work on oneself' is about the development of an 'ethics based on ascesis and aesthesis', or a kind of stylized, self-fashioning and resistance (Norris, 1994: 102) .
To take up sceptical resistance through 'exemplarity' is to take active engagement with the 'present' through the 'agonic use of reason' (Owen, 1999; Tully, 1999; Robinson, 2001 ). Foucault's analyses of the clinic, madness and discipline, and his empirical attempts to lay bare the practices of the present and the biases of discourses of medicine, psychiatry, the asylum, systems of penalty and the penitentiary belong to an 'orientation in critique' that operates through ethical showing, via exemplarity, and the agonic use of reason (Owen, 1999) . This approach is contrasted with that of Habermas, which belongs to an 'orientation in critique' operating through an ethical saying, via legislation, and the lawful use of reason. Here, Foucault's critique requires:
• de-subjectivization: analyzing the limiting conditions that subjectify us and resisting 'the ways in which we are individualized or rendered into the sort of individuals who we are' (Simons, 1995: 2) ; and • parrhesia: speaking our minds or telling the truth. This is achieved through 'creative self-representation', which warrants experimentation with alternatives and even 'limit-experiences' (see Macey, 1993; Cummings, 2000; Robinson, 2001; Foucault, 2001 ).
Foucault comes significantly closer to Bauman's postmodern ethics because he moves away from an ethics discourse grounded in maxims and practical reason (ethical saying) to an ethics discourse premised on human existence as an aesthetic phenomenon (ethical showing). The principle of autonomy is crucial here. In making this a cogent ethics, Foucault points out that autonomy is essential to a state of 'positive freedom' (Patton, 1994: 354; see also Chan, 2000 Chan, : 1065 ). For Foucault, this is a freedom of self-determination attained through an individual's exercise of critical judgment-free from the influence of dominant beliefs and desires. Indeed, Foucault explains that ethics is:
Organization Theory in Turbulent Times Andrew Chan and John Garrick . . . a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; a way of thinking and feeling; a way of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. (Foucault, 1984: 39, emphases added) Such an ethic is articulated as an orientation in thinking and a critical interrogation of 'what we are'-an investigative thinking to lay bare the arbitrariness, contingency and precariousness of present practices that affect the ways we come to recognize our own subjectivity (Foucault, 1984) . The mutually reinforcing discourses of globalization, flexible production, capital accumulation, flexibility and 'contingent work' (Cappelli, 1997 (Cappelli, , 1999 Tulgan, 1998) have recently swept the business and organizational arena. But the critique of their consequences for degradation of work and its meanings (e.g. MacIntyre, 1981; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Harrison, 1994) , and the accompanying 'corrosion of character' of people at work (Sennett, 1998) has been less well documented. It is precisely such critique that dovetails with organization theorists' ongoing debates of subjectivities at work (e.g. Casey, 1995 Casey, , 2002 du Gay, 1996; Rose, 1996; Garrick, 1998 Sennett's work is important because it provides insights into the ways in which the new capitalism has created conflict between character and experience: uncertainty is being woven into everyday work practices. Indeed, flexible change 'takes aim today at bureaucratic routine, seeks to reinvent institutions decisively and irrevocably, so that the present becomes discontinuous from the past . . . The system is fragmented; therein lies the opportunity for intervening' (Sennett, 1998: 48) .
In this context, Foucault's ideas about ethics, when integrated with works such as Sennett's, provide a powerful source of reflection, resistance and change. As Sennett (1998) puts it, this is about 'character', and that is:
. . . the ethical value we place on our own desires and our relations to others: Character focuses upon the long-term aspect of our emotional experience; it is expressed by loyalty and commitment, or through the pursuit of long-term goals or by the practice of delayed gratification for the sake of a future end. (1998: 10)
Here, we have seeds for re-enchanting organization theory in postmodern (turbulent) times, and on this point we empathize with Casey's concern about the growing importance of spirituality, renewal and revitalization Organization 9(4) Articles as means of reversing the 'moral eclipse effected by a dominant instrumental reason in organizations' (Casey, 2002: 3) .
Conclusion: Re-enchanting Organization Theory-A Postmodern Ethos
As we have argued, the critique of Foucault (and of postmodern theory more generally) has, in recent years, centred upon his disinterest in change (Feldman, 1997; Reed, 1998) , muted agency (Newton, 1998) , and nominalism and relativism (Habermas, 1987) . We have examined these standpoints and conclude that Foucault's contribution is being lightly dismissed. There is an offer to re-enchant organization theory-in precisely the ways he 'shows' freedom. This is directly applicable in contemporary organizations in which, for example, workers seek to 'express alternative, non-conformist self-identities in their style of clothing, linguistic innovation and assertions of value' in order to 'resist the self-identity erosion consequent of intensified corporatization' (Casey, 2002: 149, 158-60) .
As Sennett's research reveals, it is reasonable to be sceptical of aspects of the new 'flexible' system of capital accumulation. And Foucault's transgressive philosophy (Rajchman, 1985) assists this 'scepticism '. 3 Ironically, this is why we find no discussion in his 'postmodern ethics' in relation to emancipatory potential, socialist utopia or the dream of a rational society. Foucault's thought-style thus has postmodern affinities and he leaves no single doctrine, method or school of thought. That is, as we argued, appropriate to analysing contemporary organizations.
Postmodern leitmotifs in Foucault's ethical perspectives do provide leverage for interpreting discourses as sites and objects of/for struggle. Different groups do strive for control of (and for) the production of fixed meanings in both ideology and practice. In organization studies, we see the traces of the ethical perspectives we have outlined as leveraging space for constructive critique and not as a 'fatal distraction'.
Notes
1 For instance, see Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986: 11) ; Kelly (1994: 382-89) ; Owen (1994: 140-3) ; Nilson (1998: 80-1); and Tully (1999: 94-9 ). 2 For Foucault, writing about the past is a way of criticizing the present on the assumption that the past still informs the present in ways and with consequences we do not recognize. For Foucault, the present 'refers to those things that are constituted in our current proceedings in ways we do not realize are rooted in the past, and writing a history of it lays bare that constitution and its consequences' (Rajchman, 1985: 58) . 3 Foucault's critique does not resemble a critique of ideology and repression that has been formulated philosophically, primarily by the Frankfurt School and by Habermas. Critical theorists and Habermas argue that philosophy has been contemplative and has provided no way of realizing its ideals. The solution to the impasse, according to the critical theorists, is to reinterpret its
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Andrew Chan and John Garrick ideals, through 'lawful use of reason', and then to bring about universal (legislated) enlightenment and autonomy. Habermas finds in the very nature of human communication the potential and the ideals that philosophy has anticipated, and which it is the task of a critical theory to help humankind accept.
